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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with its landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the United States Su-
preme Court has continued to expand the trial court's role in
evaluating the reliability of proffered expert testimony before it
reaches the jury. In Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), its most recent refinement of Daubert, the Supreme Court
clarified that this "gate-keeping" function is not limited to complex
scientific testimony. Rather, the trial court must scrutinize all types
of proffered expert testimony, applying whichever measures of reli-
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ability it deems appropriate, which may or may not include the
Daubert factors.
This places a heavy burden on the trial court, especially in a
products liability action. The court not only must analyze expert
testimony on a variety of issues - general causation, specific causa-
tion, damages, etc. - but also must determine which Daubert factors
or other measures of reliability should apply to that evaluation. Ul-
timately, the task of steering the court along this complicated path
falls on attorneys.
This article begins with a discussion of expanding judicial scru-
tiny of expert testimony through the vehicles of Daubert, Joiner and
Kumho Tire. The article then analyzes the post-Kumho Tire frame-
work under which the trial court must discharge its duties as gate-
keeper. The article concludes with an exploration of non-Daubert
reliability factors that may apply to expert testimony in products li-
ability actions.
II. THE PRE-DAUBERTERA
Before Daubert, the trial court's role as to expert testimony was
both clearly defined and relatively straightforward: evaluate the ex-
pert's qualifications to ensure they satisfied Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702,1 determine whether the expert's testimony was relevant
to the issues at trial and was supported by adequate foundation as• 2
required by Federal Rule of Evidence 703, and then simply subject
the expert's testimony to the collective wisdom of the jury delibera-
tion process. Courts were reluctant to examine the substantive va-
lidity of an expert's testimony and seldom excluded a qualified ex-
pert's testimony for any reason other than potential prejudice or
1. Fed. R. Evid. 702 provides
Testimony by Experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Id.
2. FED. R. EvID 703(a) provides:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. (a) The facts or data in the par-
ticular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be
those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.
[Vol. 27:1
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• 3
irrelevance. Flaws and inadequacies in opinions were something
to be exposed through cross-examination. Thus, courts typically
deferred to the jury's determination as to the merits of an expert's
testimony. "If a judge prevents an expert from testifying on the
ground that the expert or his opinions seem unreliable, the judge
interferes with the jury's exercise of these powers.,4
Only when trial courts were faced with expert testimony in a
new scientific or technical arena would they occasionally apply the
"general acceptance" test articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923),' to determine whether the testimony should
be heard by the jury. Yet, Fye required judges only to determine
whether the methodology was generally accepted within the ap-
propriate scientific community, not to evaluate the science underly-
ing the expert's opinion. Frye recognized that courts are not labo-
ratories and acknowledged the realistic limitations of judges to
comprehend scientific evidence. Thus, Frye set down a convenient
proxy for assuring the competency of scientific evidence, namely
consensus within the scientific community.6
Although the Frye opinion was not restricted to the analysis of
new, evidence-generating instruments, it was nonetheless applied
most often to evaluate the admissibility of devices and procedures
such as the polygraph or DNA testing in criminal cases, where such
evidence may appear incontrovertible if deemed accurate. Civil
courts generally ignored Frye except in cases involving paternity de-
terminations through blood testing. Though seldom applied, the
3. E.g., CHARLES TILFoRD McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 874-75 (4th ed. 1992) ("Any
relevant conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be received
unless there are distinct reasons for exclusion. These reasons are the familiar ones
of prejudicing or misleading the jury or consuming undue amounts of time.").
4. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6266, at
n.15 (1997).
5. In Fye, the D.C. Court of Appeals excluded expert testimony regarding
the results of a systolic blood pressure lie-detector test because the test had not yet
gained "general acceptancd' in the scientific community. Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
6. The concept of "acceptance in the scientific community" generated many
questions: In which scientific "community" must there be consensus? How is con-
sensus determined - is a substantial minority enough? E.g., State v. Fenney, 448
N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1989). How is "consensus" proven in court? Under Frye, a court
could predetermine the outcome by how it answered these questions as to the
relevant scientific community and the meaning of "consensus." Frye, 293 F. at
1014.
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Frye test remained the standard in federal courts for 70 years, and
to this day remains the basic test of admissibility in some state
8
courts.
As science in the courtroom became more commonplace, the
Frye standard was criticized for excluding evidence based upon new
but reliable scientific techniques simply because the techniques
had not yet had time to gain "general acceptance" in the scientific
community. As one court explained, the Frye test "emphasizes
'counting scientists' votes rather than verifying the soundness of a
scientific conclusion."9 Applied literally, the Frye test could exclude
legitimate cutting-edge science offered prior to the formation of
any scientific consensus. 0 At the same time, it could allow the in-
troduction of scientific testimony that was generally accepted, but
simply wrong.
After the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
courts began to scrutinize expert testimony more closely, express-
ing concern for the jury's ability to assess the validity of complex
scientific theories." During the following decade, as complex
medical and toxic tort cases mushroomed, the role of experts in
litigation was criticized as 'Junk science," "litigation medicine" and
"fringe science," both by commentators and courts.14  This
8. Minnesota is one such state. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently re-
jected Daubert, choosing instead to adhere to the state's modified Frye test, termed
Frye-Mack. Goeb v. Tharaldson, _N.W.2d_ (Aug. 17, 2000). The Mack prong of the
Fry-Mack standard requires not only that the scientific technique be generally ac-
cepted in the relevant scientific community, but also that the particular evidence
derived from that technique has a foundation that is scientifically reliable. State v.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Minn. 1980).
9. People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 439 (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (quoting
Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 42 (App. D.C. 1988)).
10. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6266, at n.15.
11. O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison, 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1391 (C.D. Ill.
1992), affd, 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The court is concerned that the jury
may blindly accept an expert's opinion that conforms with their underlying fears
of toxic substances without carefully examining the basis for that opinion.").
12. Comment, Sharpening the Focus on Daubert's Distinction Between Scientifc and
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1719, 1721 (1997) (hypothesiz-
ing that the use of expert testimony has increased proportionately with the in-
crease of technology in society).
13. P. Gianelli, Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
105 (1993). See generally PETERW. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991), which popularized the term 'junk science." But see Daniel
Shuman, et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts-
Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 194 (1994) (positing that the
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"anti-expert" atmosphere set the stage for the Supreme Court's
1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. "1 5
III. THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 702: DAUBERT, JOYNER AND KUMHO
TIRE
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), 16 is often preceded by the adjective "landmark" for two
good reasons. First, Daubert rejected Frye's "rigid general accep-
tance requirement" as contradictory to the "liberal thrust" of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 17 replacing it with a variety of criteria for
scientific reliability. Second, Daubert specifically anointed the trial
court as the "gatekeeper" to determine whether an expert's testi-
mony pertains to "scientific knowledge.""' This gate-keeping role
involves two functions: first, the trial court must determine whether
the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert's testimony
"can properly be applied to the facts at issue" - that is, whether it is
relevant; and, second, the trial court must determine whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is "scientifi-
cally valid." 19 To make this last assessment, the trial court should
14. E.g., O'Connor, 807 F. Supp. at 1401. The court noted
The importance of safeguarding the integrity of the [judicial] process
requires the trial [or appellate] judge, when he believes that an expert's
testimony has fallen below professional standards, to say so, as many
judges have done. Professor Bryan cast aside his scholar's mantle and be-
came a shill [for the plaintiff]; Judge Hart, by observing that the emperor
had no clothes, protected the interests of the judicial system.
15. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert addressed the admissibility of expert testi-
mony purportedly linking Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug, to birth de-
fects. Id. at 582. Plaintiffs experts, all of whom were well-credentialed, intended
to testify that they found a causal correlation between ingestion of Bendectin dur-
ing pregnancy and limb deformities. Id. at 583. The experts based their conclu-
sions not on human studies, but on "in vitro" (test tube) and "in vivo" (live) stud-
ies, which were not generally accepted within the field of epidemiology. Id. The
trial court granted Merrell Dow's summary judgment motion after finding that the
plaintiffs' expert testimony was not based on valid epidemiological methods and
was therefore inadmissible because it was not grounded in "generally accepted"
scientific evidence. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, applying the Frye test. Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1990).
16. Despite its renown, the pronunciation of "Daubert" remains varied. The
preferred pronunciation is "Dow-burt". See Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of
Expert Testimony After Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EMoRY L. J. 867 (1994).
17. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.
153, 169 (1988)).
18. Id. at 589-90.
19. Id. at 592-93.
2000]
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consider the following non-exclusive factors, which are now
well-known as the "Daubert factors":
(1)Whether the scientific theory or technique can be or
has been tested;
(2)Whether the theory or technique has been subject to
peer review or publication;
(3) The known or potential rate of error; and
(4)The general acceptance of the theory or technique in
the scientific community.
20
Ultimately, Daubert is a compromise. It acknowledges that
judges are probably ill suited to evaluate the merits of scientific
opinions, or at least no better suited than are juries. Accordingly,
judges are instructed to look to certain factors that are indicia of
reliability, rather than to confirm the reliability of the science itself.
While the judge need not understand the science being offered,
the judge must find circumstances suggesting its legitimacy, such as
peer-reviewed publication, reproducible results, and the former
proxy for reliability, "general acceptance. 21
But even this relatively limited foray into the scientific process
underlying an expert's opinion imposes a heavy burden on trial
judges. Rather than simply deferring to the "general acceptance"
of the experts themselves, trial judges must weigh a complex set of
philosophical and methodological factors to determine the admis-
22sibility of proffered scientific evidence. In other words, Daubert
requires trial judges to replace their judicial robes with lab coats
and to become "amateur scientists. 2 1 Courts, however, are typically
ill-equipped to perform this function. Law and science use differ-
20. Id. at 593-94. General acceptance in the scientific community, the former
Frye test, has therefore been diminished to a single reliability factor. While "gen-
eral acceptance" in the scientific community is not required, a known technique
that has attracted only minimal support among scientists "may properly be viewed
with skepticism." Id. at 594.
21. Daubert also endorses the traditional means of testing evidence through
the adversary process rather than wholesale exclusion of evidence through an un-
compromising test. "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and ap-
propriate means of attacking shaky evidence." Id. at 597.
22. Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of
Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REv. 803, 804
(1997).
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ent methodologies and have different goals.'4 Lawyers and judges
typically do not have the educational foundation to evaluate fully
quantitative, scientific and technical information.25 In fact, the
Daubert opinion itself appears to contemplate this possible pitfall
and a related judicial recalcitrance to delve into scientific analysis-
by suggesting that courts could be assisted in their gate-keeping du-
ties by appointing neutral experts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706.26
As the Court anticipated, many judges were reluctant to re-
place Frye's straight-forward general acceptance test with Daubert's• . 27
more challenging analysis. The Ninth Circuit panel that ad-
dressed Daubert on remand was openly skeptical. The panel noted
that the judge's responsibility under Daubert is "a far more complex
and daunting task" than applying the relatively simple Frye test, par-
ticularly when judges are faced with "matters at the very cutting
24. Marilee Kapsa & Carl Meyer, Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More
Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 313, 321 (1999). See also Alexander Morgan Capron,
Daubert And The Quest For Value-Free 'Scientific Knowledge' in The Courtroom, 30 U.
RICH. L. REv. 85, 85 n.2 (1996). Capron stated:
Science is essentially descriptive, positive and predictive. The goal is to
tell us what is and what will be in the future. Law, on the other hand, is
prescriptive and normative. The effort is to tell us what ought to be, to
define rules of conduct and responsibility grounded in events of the past.
Id.
25. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Deci-
sions?, 6 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 42-43 (1997). Saks contends
[L]awyers are people who, disproportionately more than most educated
Americans, are uncomfortable with quantitative, scientific, and techno-
logical information; avoided it as students, and are incompetent with it as
adults. By contrast, a well assembled jury containing a high school sci-
ence teacher, an accountant, or an engineer, should have greater poten-
tial than the average judge to understand complex technical or quantita-
tive evidence.
Id.
26. FED. R. EVID. 706. Court-appointed experts, though employed by some
courts, are typically not favored by courts or commentators. See generally Note, Im-
proving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 941 (Feb. 1997); Ned Miltenberg, Myths About 'Neutral' Scientific Experts, TRIAL
Jan. 2000; Carl Meyer, Science and Law: The Quest for the Neutral Expert: A View From
the Trenches, 13J. ENERGYNAT. RESOURCES& ENVrL. L. 36 (1997).
27. See generally Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded By Science: How Judges Avoid the
Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55 (1998). The fear that Daubert
would place ill-suited responsibilities on trial judges prompted a number of states
to retain Frye. E.g., Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993). "[A] court-
room is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the place to conduct scientific ex-
periments. If the scientific community considers a procedure or process unreli-
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edge of scientific research, where fact meets theory and certainty
dissolves into probability. 2 s
Judicial resistance to Daubert was most clearly manifested
through attempts to avoid gate-keeping responsibilities by inter-
preting Daubert as applicable only to "scientific" expert testimony,
not to testimony based on "technical or other specialized knowl-
edge. ''29 Under this view, the Daubert framework applied only to
"seemingly infallible scientific devices, processes and theories" and
to expert opinions relying upon "the natural laws of science";30 it
therefore did not apply to expert testimony based upon experience
and observation, such as engineering opinions, 3' medical causation
32 13opinions and warnings-related opinions.
A majority of lower courts, however, interpreted Daubert as im-
posing a gate-keeping obligation to scrutinize any type of proffered
expert testimony. These courts concluded that Daubert's guiding
principles applied to all expert testimony because Rule 702 governs
the admissibility of expert evidence regarding not only "scientific,"
28. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315-16. The panel reluctantly accepted its gate-
keeping role: "Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we
take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task." Id. at 1316.
29. These courts commonly cited Chief Justice Rehnquist's partial dissent in
Daubert, which questioned whether the majority standard would apply to "an ex-
pert seeking to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowledge."
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Daubert majority did not address this question because the nature of
the expertise at issue was "limited to the scientific context." Id. at 590 n.8. The
majority did note, however, that "Rule 702 also applies to 'technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge."' Id.
30. See generally WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6266, at n.62-63 (noting areas
where courts have extended and refused to extend the Daubert analysis).
31. E.g., McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that Daubert does not apply to testimony based on expert's engineer-
ing experience and his having investigated hundreds of fork lift cases over the past
thirty years); Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that Daubert factors are applicable "only when a proffered expert relies on
some principle or methodology," not "in cases where expert testimony is based
solely upon experience or training," and allowing a mechanical engineer to testify
as to defective vehicle design under a traditional Rule 702 analysis).
32. E.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (conclud-
ing that clinical medicine, as opposed to research and laboratory medical science,
is not a hard science discipline; Daubert factors, which are techniques derived from
hard science methodology, are, as a general rule, inappropriate for use in making
the reliability assessment of expert clinical medical testimony).
33. E.g., Yamaha Motor Co., USA v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1998) (hold-
ing that assessment of warnings by a qualified expert were admissible as "special-
ized knowledge;" Daubert criteria specifically limited to subjects of expertise totally
governed by the scientific method).
[Vol. 27:1
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but also "technical, or other specialized knowledge. 3 4 Therefore,
Daubert's analysis spread to expert opinions of any kind, including
testimony regarding engineering principles and design defects,
accounting and damages issues and even such "soft sciences" as
psychology and sociology.
The Supreme Court first addressed lower courts'
Daubert-related confusion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997), in which it resolved a circuit split over the proper stan-
dard of review to apply to a district court's ruling on the admission
of expert testimony. Some circuits applied the same standard of
review as they would to any evidentiary determination-abuse of
38discretion. Other circuits scrutinized district court decisions re-garding expert testimony, which often arose in a summary judg-
34. Eg., Watkins v. Telsmith Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Daubert applies to all types of expert testimony including a civil engineer's testi-
mony based on his training and experience, in a conveyor design defect case).
35. E.g., Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
1997) (applying Daubert to affidavit of expert, an experienced consultant in the
fields of failure analysis, mechanical safety and accident reconstruction, and af-
firming grant of summary judgment because affidavit was "nakedly conclusional");
Surace v. Caterpillar Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1055 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming the dis-
trict court's decision, in a design defect case, to exclude the testimony of an elec-
tro-magnetic engineer under Daubert); Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 367-
368 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that our 'inquiry is governed by Daubert' and affirming
exclusion of proposed engineering testimony on alleged design defect in trim
press); Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that testimony of proffered expert regarding alleged design defect
in hypothermia machine was inadmissible under Daubert where expert did not
conduct any studies or apply his analysis to the facts of the case); Dancy v. Hyster
Co., 127 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Daubert to proposed testimony of me-
chanical engineer regarding defective design of forklift and finding testimony in-
admissible because, inter alia, it "could be, but had not been, tested"); Peitzmeier v.
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the "Daubert
analysis is properly applied" to proposed testimony of engineering expert regard-
ing alleged design defect in tire changer and excluding testimony as "wholly
speculative").
36. E.g., Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993)
(applying Daubert to exclude accountant's opinion of market valuation because
accountant failed to follow generally accepted accounting principles); Ventura v.
Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's admission
of expert's damages testimony under Daubert).
37. E.g., Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (assessing
under Daubert the admissibility of two of plaintiffs proffered experts-a professor of
sociology and a person with expertise in the areas of psychology, statistics and
marketing-in a racial discrimination case).
38. E.g., Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding abuse of discretion standard of review applies to trial court's decision to
admit expert testimony under Daubert).
2000]
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ment context, under a higher or even de novo standard of review.39
Joiner rejected a "particularly stringent" standard of review and held
that appellate courts should apply an "abuse of discretion" standard
40to district courts' rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony.
Joiner also addressed, in dicta, Daubert's gate-keeping duty, ex-
plaining that the trial court should examine not only the expert's
methodology, but also his or her conclusions.4' As the majority
elaborated, "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.,
42
Even if the expert's methodology falls within scientific boundaries,
the trial court may still conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered•.4  But
Joiner lacked the factual foundation necessary for the Supreme
Court to resolve the conflict as to whether Daubert's analysis applied
to both "scientific" and "technical" expert testimony.44
The Court finally confronted this contentious issue in Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), holding that
Daubert's gate-keeping obligation extends to all expert testimony,,t • 45
whether based on "scientific" or "nonscientific" knowledge. As the
Supreme Court explained, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 applies a
reliability standard to all "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge," making no relevant distinction between these catego-
39. E.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 78 F.3d 524, 533 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying
a "particularly stringent" standard of review and reversed the district court's deci-
sion to exclude expert testimony that occupational PCB exposure caused plaintiffs
cancer).
40. Gen. Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1997).
41. Id. at 146. Contra Alexander v. Smith & Nephew P.L.C., 98 F. Supp.2d
1310 (N.D. Okla. 2000) ("The Court does not focus on an expert's conclusions but
on whether his principles and methodology are sound.").
42. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
43. Id. For an argument that Joiner "expresses a normative judgment that
judges are to be trusted more than juries" when science and law intersect, see
Lucinda Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their
Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 335
(1999).
44. Joiner was comparable to Daubert in that it involved a "hard science" expert
prepared to testify about the causal link between a certain agent and potential
health effects. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143.
45. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). The
Court acknowledged that its decision in Daubert referred only to "scientific knowl-
edge," but explained that this was so only because the expertise at issue was scien-
tific in nature. Id. at 147.
[Vol. 27:1
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ries.46 To conclude otherwise would create differing systems of evi-
dentiary rules dependent upon an artificial distinction between
"types" of expert testimony offered: "Pure scientific theory itself
may depend for its development upon observation and properly
engineered machinery. And conceptual efforts to distinguish the
two are unlikely to.lRroduce clear legal lines capable of application
in particular cases.
Therefore, when faced with any proffered expert testimony,
whether characterized as "scientific" or "technical," the trial judge
must determine whether the testimony has "a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline." The
Daubert factors may be applicable to this analysis if they are "reason-
able measures of the reliability of expert testimony" under the par-
ticular circumstances of the particular case at issue. 4s However, the
test of reliability is a "flexible one," and the Daubert factors do not
constitute a "definite checklist or test" that "neither necessarily nor
exclusively applies to all experts or in every 
case. ,49
Although the trial court cannot avoid its ultimate obligation to
ensure the reliability of expert testimony, it has broad latitude in
deciding how to make that reliability determination. 50  The trial
46. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147. The case arose from an automobile accident
that plaintiffs alleged was caused by a design or manufacturing defect in the vehi-
cle's tire. Id. at 137. The District Court applied Daubert and excluded the testi-
mony of plaintiffs' expert in tire failure analysis. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that Daubert's analysis applies "only where an expert re-
lies 'on the application of scientific principles,' rather than 'on skill - or experi-
ence-based observation." Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (1lth
Cir. 1997).
47. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148. Justice Breyer emphasized, however, that the
judge's gate-keeping function must not invade the province of the jury, which
bears the responsibility to "decide among conflicting views of different experts,
even though the evidence is "shaky." Id. at 153.
48. Id. at 153.
49. Id. at 150. The Court explained why the Daubert factors might not apply:
It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim
made by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for
the particular application at issue may never previously have interested
any scientist. Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of a Daubert's
general acceptance factor help show that an expert's testimony is reliable
where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories
grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or
necromancy.
Id. at 151.
50. Id. at 152. As Justice Scalia elaborated in his concurrence: The trial
court's discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability is not discre-
tion to abandon the gate-keeping function. Id. at 158-59. (Scalia, J., concurring.)
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judge should consider the nature of the case, the expert's particu-
lar expertise, and the subject of his or her testimony, keeping in
mind that the ultimate objective of Daubert "is to make certain that
an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same levels of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice or an expert in the
relevant field."
While Kumho Tire clarifies that the Daubert analysis must be ap-
plied to all expert testimony, it expands the gate-keeping mandate
to the trial court: instead of simply applying the Daubert factors to
an expert's proffered testimony, the trial court must now first de-
termine which of those factors apply, if any, and which other "rea-
sonable measures of reliability" may be appropriately applied, given
the type of case, the expert's particular expertise and the subjectS 52
matter of the expert's testimony. To complicate matters, the trial
court must undertake this exercise for each expert whose testimony
is at issue. The potential magnitude of this undertaking in a prod-
ucts liability action should not be underestimated. Trial courts
faced with opinions in a variety of fields, each of which employs dif-
ferent methodologies and operates on different assumptions, will
invariably look to the attorneys to help identify the framework un-
der which to evaluate each expert's testimony and to understand
how that framework applies to the testimony at issue.
IV. KUMHO IRE: WHERE THE RUBBER HITS THE ROAD
Kumho Tire adds an extra dimension to the Daubert analysis.
"Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise
that is fausse and science that is junky. Though, as the Court makes clear today,
the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or
another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion." Id. at
159.
51. Id. at 152.
52. As with Daubert before it, Kumho Tire has elicited criticism from courts and
legal commentators alike. E.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp.2d 62, 67 (D.
Mass. 1999) (interpreting Kumho Tire as sending a "mixed message": "[a]pply
Daubert to technical fields, even though the scientific method may not really fit,
but be flexible"); see also Comment, Opening the Door But Keeping the Lights Off:
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert Test to Nonscientific
Evidence, 50 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 177 (1999); Kimberly M. Hrabosky, Kumho Tire
v. Carmichael: Stretching Daubert Beyond Recognition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 203
(1999). But see Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1999)
("Kumho Tire refines in a common-sense way, but does not undermine, the use of
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Before the trial court undertakes the substantive analysis of an ex-
pert's proffered testimony, it must first determine which factors
should inform that analysis. The court should begin its examina-
tion with the four Daubert factors. In some cases, all the Daubert
factors will apply squarely. Expert "scientific" testimony on issues of
general causation, as in Daubert and Joiner, for instance, should typi-
cally be subject to a garden-variety Daubert analysis. But not all
Daubert factors may be pertinent in every instance of scientific tes-
54timony. For example, a legitimate scientific claim may not have
been subject to peer review if no scientist or publication had an in-.. 55
terest in the specific application.
Even proffered expert engineering testimony, which often
rests on the personal knowledge or experience of the engineer,• 56
may invoke the Daubert factors. By way of example, two of the
Daubert inquiries - (1) whether the expert's hypothesis can be and
has been tested; and (2) whether the theory~or techniques used to
develop the theory is generally accepted within the relevant com-
munity - may be meaningful measures of the reliability of expert
engineering testimony regarding the design of an aerosol spray
can.57 While there is no technical discipline of "aerosol can design"
or any journals or treatises specifically devoted to that topic, certain
general scientific and engineering principles are applicable to the
design of aerosol cans, and their application to aerosol sprav can
design can be analyzed under these two other Daubert factors.'
53. Black, 171 F.3d at 311; Smith v. Borden, Inc., 188 F.R.D. 257, 260 (M.D.
La. 1999); Nugent v. Hercules Offshore Corp., No. Civ. A 98-3060, 2000 WL
381925 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2000).
54. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151. Ironically, Kumho Tire creates the possibility
that a court could determine that only the "general acceptance" factor applies,
thereby analyzing the expert testimony under the Frye standard.
55. Id.
56. Id. As explained in Kumho Tire, when an expert posits an experi-
ence-based methodology, the court should ascertain:
how often an engineering expert's experience-based methodology has
produced erroneous results, or whether such method is generally ac-
cepted in the relevant engineering community. Likewise, it will at times
be useful to ask even of a witness whose expertise is based purely on ex-
perience... whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field
would recognize as acceptable.
Id.
57. Smith, 188 F.R.D. at 257.
58. Id. See also Donnelly v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.Supp.2d 45, 49-50 (E.D. N.Y.
1999) (finding that "the four Daubert factors are an appropriate starting point for
assessing the reliability" of an engineering expert's opinion and, after applying the
factors, excluding the expert's testimony as unreliable given the absence of any
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Once the trial court considers the Daubert factors, the court
may then consider whether other "reasonable measures of reliabil-
ity," not mentioned in Daubert, may be appropriate to the evalua-
ton of the expert testimony at issues. 9 While these "reasonable
measures of reliability" have yet to be delineated by what promises
to be an expansive body of case law, Kumho Tire gives some sugges-
tions, as do other recent product liability cases, of the types of ques-
tions attorneys and courts should contemplate when confronting
proffered expert testimony in a products liability action.
A. Did The Expert Employ The Same "Intellectual Rigor" In The
Courtroom As Required In The Laboratory Or Field?
While the Daubert factors may easily apply to "hard science"
opinions, those same factors may not contribute to a meaningful
analysis of an expert's fact-dependent methodology.61 In those in-
stances, the gate-keeping court may analyze the reliability of the
expert's testimony under Kumho Tire's mandate that the expert em-
ploy "in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of the expert in the relevant field. 6M For
instance, a professional engineer's conclusion, based on his own in-
spection, that a tile floor was "slippery" and that overhead lighting
was "inadequate," without some explanation of the methods and
objective standards employed to make those determinations, fails
to adhere to the standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded
of civil engineers. 62 Even when an expert relies on "textbook mod-
els" and "well-established formulae," the expert may not apply them
underlying methodology or reasoning).
59. Black, 171 F.3d at 311; Smith, 188 F.R.D. at 261.
60. E.g., Nugent v. Hercules Offshore Corp., No. Civ. A 98-3060, 2000 WL
381925 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2000) (recognizing that the court should first attempt to
apply the Daubert factors, but analyzing failure expert's testimony under an "intel-
lectual rigor" inquiry).
61. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147.
62. Borgognone v. Trump Plaza, No. 98-CV-6139, 2000 WL 341135 (E.D.N.Y.,
March 9, 2000) citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151, and Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84
F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Donnelly v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F. Supp.2d
45, 49-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that engineering expert who offered con-
clusions without explaining the reasoning or methodology by which he reached
them failed to apply the requisite "intellectual rigor"); Rutigliano v. Valley Bus.
Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 786 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Dr. Pantiz's conclusions derive from
her unquantifiable personal experience and instinct, not from scientific theory
and reasoning. This is not the type of expert scientific reasoning that the Court
may submit to ajury."), affd, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997).
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as would other experts in the field. Likewise, the expert may fail
to comply with the scientific norm if he applies valid models or for-
mulae to data that would not be trusted in the laboratory
Courts are especially apt to conclude that an expert's testi-
mony lacks the requisite "intellectual rigor" when the expert's opin-
ions, or the underlying methodology, were developed solely in a
65litigation context. For instance, when the Daubert case was re-
manded, the Ninth Circuit questioned the reliability of plaintiffs'
experts' opinions, not because these experts were unqualified or
solely because their methodology may have been suspect, but also
because none had studied the matters upon which their testimony.... 66
was offered outside of a litigation context. A significant factor to
the court was "whether the experts are proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research that they
have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying"
since "a scientist's normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the
courtroom or the lawyer's office. ' ' 6 7 Other courts have similarly re-
jected expert testimony developed in a litigation context, even
where the expert was qualified and the methodology and resulting
opinions may have superficially satisfied Daubert's testing 6s and
63. E.g., Edwards v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (S.D. Fla.
1999).
64. Id.
65. Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1479 (D.VI.
1994), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994)("In evaluating the scientific validity or
reliability of a particular methodology, it is also appropriate for a trial court to
consider whether the methodology is used in a non-judicial setting. If a method-
ology has not been put to any nonjudicial use, it weighs against admissibility.").
This case and those cited infra at notes 67-70 suggest an intersection between the
expert's credibility and the reliability of his or her testimony. The unarticulated
assumption is that an expert's bias, whether conscious or unconscious, in favor of
the party by whom he or she is employed will influence the reliability of his or her
opinions. See also Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994)
("[S]cientists whose conviction about the ultimate conclusion of their research is
so firm that they are willing to aver under oath that it is correct prior to perform-
ing the necessary validating tests could properly be viewed by the district court as
lacking the objectivity that is the hallmark of the scientific method.").
66. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
The court further noted, "While plaintiffs' scientists are all experts in their respec-
tive fields, none claims to have studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction
defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases." Id.
67. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
68. E.g., Natl. Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 191 F.3d
858, 864 (8th Cir. 1999) (excluding expert opinions not based on "any
pre-litigation" research); Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996)
2000]
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peer-review criteria.69
B. Did The Expert Rule Out Other Possible Causes?
Specific causation opinions have often been particularly diffi-
cult for trial courts to fit into the Daubert framework. For example,
while peer-reviewed studies conducted according to accepted
methodology can resolve general causation issues - i.e., can a drug
cause a harmful condition 0 - studies cannot provide a framework
for addressing specific causation issues - i.e., did the drug cause the
condition in this particular plaintiff. Merely proving that the plain-
tiff received a drug known to cause a certain condition, and that
the plaintiff later developed that condition, does not establish aS 71
causal link. Instead, differential diagnosis - the process of elimi-
nating other possible causes - is an essential methodological com-
ponent in establishing specific causation."
Differential diagnosis is also important in design defect cases,
(" [Plaintiffs expert] had never tested human or animal tissues for the presence of
asbestos fibers (or, so far as appears, for anything else) before being hired by the
plaintiff's lawyer."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 480 (1996); Estate of Mitchell v. Gen-
corp, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D. Kan. 1997) ("We ... find it significant that all
of plaintiffs experts developed their opinions expressly for the purpose of testify-
ing. None of the witnesses has done any research on his theories outside the con-
text of this suit.").
69. E.g., Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Although [plaintiffs expert] published the 1984 article prior to this litigation,
he was at that time already a professional plaintiffs witness. It is not unreasonable
to presume that [his] opinion... was influenced by a litigation-driven financial in-
centive.").
70. In Daubert, the proffered expert testimony sought to answer a question of
general causation-was there sufficient epidemiological evidence that the drug
Bendectin caused birth defects? Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1319.
71. Wooley v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 703 (S.D. Tex.
1999) (finding that a causal conclusion based solely on a temporal connection be-
tween surgical implant and alleged injuries does not constitute valid scientific
methodology).
72. Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 791 (D.NJ. 1996), affd,
118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997) (excluding physician's causation testimony where she
was unable to exclude other possible explanations); see also Claar v. Burlington N.
R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Neither Dr. Hines nor Dr. Nelson made
any effort to rule out other possible causes for the injuries plaintiffs complain of,
even though they admitted that this step would be standard procedure before ar-
riving at a diagnosis."); Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp.2d 1310
(N.D. Okla. 2000) (excluding testimony of expert who merely examined plaintiff
and his medical records, without eliminating or even considering other possible
causes); Valente v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp.2d 862 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (excluding
expert testimony as to causation because expert gave conclusory opinions, failed to
identify a specific defect and failed to perform differential diagnosis).
[Vol. 27:1
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especially if an expert disregards, not just fails to eliminate, evi-
dence of other potential causes. For instance, in Kumho Tire the
district court rejected the plaintiffs expert's opinion that the tire
separated due to a manufacturing defect because the expert disre-
garded evidence that suggested the separation resulted from abuse
through over deflection, not a defect. For this reason, the court
concluded that the expert's testimony was fundamentally unreli-
able.74
The trial court's inquiry does not end, however, simply because
the expert purports to have excluded other causes. The court must
further ensure that the "differential diagnosis" was conducted in
accordance with appropriate methodological standards by a quali-
fied expert.715 This means that a trial court evaluating evidence ex-
cluding other causes in a drug or medical device case may be com-
pelled to analyze the testimony of a number of experts in different
fields. For example, to prove that birth defects in a particular
plaintiff were caused by a drug that is a proven teratogen, expert
testimony may be required in fields such as genetics, nutrition,
toxicology, occupational health and statistics to eliminate the pos-
sibility that the birth defects were caused by a vitamin deficiency, a
work-place chemical hazard or simply a genetic variation, rather
76than the drug.
C. Has The Expert Established The Existence Of An Alternative Feasible
Design ?
Many courts have concluded that an expert may not merely
criticize the design of a product without establishing that a better
73. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1999).
74. Id.
75. E.g., Nat]. Bank of Commerce v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 191 F.3d 858,
861 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that even if a plaintiff "rules out" other causes, he
must still produce evidence "ruling in" the asserted cause).
76. See Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 24, at 422; see also Edwards v. Safety-Kleen
Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (excluding specific causation opinion
that benzene exposure caused plaintiffs bone marrow disease where plaintiff's ex-
pert failed to determine whether other chemicals in plaintiffs workplace could
have caused his condition and failed to cite any epidemiological or toxicologic
studies linking MDS to certain levels of benzene exposure); Nat'l. Bank of Com-
merce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1523 (E.D. Ark. 1996), affd, 133 F.3d
1132 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[P]laintiffs have no qualified expert to offer an opinion to a
jury which would permit that jury to conclude that genetics have been ruled out as
a possible cause of Ashley's birth defects.").
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reasonable alternative exists.77 Typically, the proper methodology
for proposing alternative designs includes more than just concep-
781
tualizing possibilities. It often involves design development, pro-
totypes and testing.79 As one court noted, "the history of engineer-
ing and science is filled with finely conceived ideas that are
unworkable in practice. ''80 Courts have therefore consistently ex-
cluded expert testimony involving proposed design changes that
have never been designed, developed and tested."] Even in the ab-
sence of an alternative design and testing, however, an expert's tes-
timony about design alternatives may be admissible if devices in-
corporating the expert's proposals have been manufactured and
are in service.
77. E.g., Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997) (noting that expert had "never designed, built, or
tested a platform that has been shown to reduce the launch effect of an exploding
tire and wheel assembly while adequately supporting the tire and wheel assembly
during the tire-changing process").
78. Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 992 (5th Cir. 1997).
79. Id. at 992 ("[T]he proper methodology for proposing alternative designs
includes more than just conceptualizing possibilities. The district court appropri-
ately noted the lack of testing of any of the proposed alternatives."); Cummins v.
Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368-70 (7th Cir. 1996). The court concluded that the
expert's opinion was not:
derived from the scientific method [where expert failed to conduct any
testing regarding the degree to which the alternative design is compati-
ble] with existing systems and circuits; the relative efficiency of the two
designs; the short- and long-term maintenance costs associated with the
alternative design; the ability of the purchaser to service and to maintain
the alternative design; the relative cost of installing the two designs; and
the effect, if any, that the alternative design would have on the price of
the machine. Many of these considerations are product-and manufac-
turer-specific, and most cannot be determined reliably without testing.
Id. Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 568 (N.D. I11. 1993) (ex-
cluding expert testimony because "the most important factor is whether the tech-
nique (or theory) being advanced by the expert can be or has been tested. The
answer here is that it can be and, to some extent, was, and it failed. Clark offered
no testable design to support his concept.").
80. Stanczyk, 836 F. Supp. at 568.
81. E.g., Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999);
Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 S. Ct. 1004
(1998).
82. McPike v. Corghi S.P.A., 87 F. Supp.2d 890 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (admitting
expert testimony regarding design defects in tire changing machine, even though
expert's testimony was excluded in Pietzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d
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D. Even If The Expert's Methodology Is Proper, Is There Too Great An
"Analytical Gap" Between The Data And The Opinion Offered?
Some courts have cited the "analytical gap" language of Joiner"
to reject an expert's ultimate conclusions, even though the expert
followed accepted scientific methodology that otherwise satisfied
the Daubert framework. Expert testimony often involves some de-
gree of interpretation or extrapolation from appropriately applied
methodology and properly collected data. While a certain amount
of extrapolation may be palatable, and even necessary, in the labo-
ratory, the gate-keeping court must ensure that expert testimon
does not make an analytical leap too tenuous for the courtroom.
Even a plausible hypothesis, the best that science can offer in many
arenas, may not constitute knowledge capable of assisting a
fact-finder.
E. Is The Expert Qualified To Give A Reliable Opinion?
Buried within Daubert is a philosophical subtext regarding the
relationship between an expert's qualifications and the perceived
reliability of his or her testimony. Daubert was, to a certain extent, a
reaction against the concern that judges and juries are unduly in-
fluenced by heavily-credentialed experts whose testimony carries
83. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("A court may conclude
that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.").
84. E.g., Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1999);JMJ Enter., Inc.
v. Via Veneto Italian Water Ice, Inc., 1998 WL 175888 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (excluding
certified public accountant's testimony as to breach of contract damages because
of an "analytical gap" in his knowledge and reasoning).
85. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
86. E.g., Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Dr.
Fozzard's deposition, while expressing what may be an insightful, even an inspired,
hunch concerning the cause of the heart attack that Rosen experienced in June of
1992, lacks scientific rigor... [T]he courtroom is not the place for scientific guess-
work, even of the inspired sort."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 73 (1996); Edwards v.
Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("At best, the litera-
ture and hypotheses put forward by Dr. Golomb show a possibility of future gen-
eral acceptance, providing that future testing can confirm Dr. Golomb's theory
until that point in time, however, the theory is not scientifically reliable."); Tread-
well v. Dow-United Techs., 970 F. Supp. 974, 982 (M.D. Ala. 1997) ("In the instant
action, the court adopts the reasoning and conclusions of the [other] courts,
which found that 'the "science" of MCS's etiology has not progressed from the
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• • 1- ,87the potential to be "both powerful and quite misleading. There-
fore, the Daubert court sought to provide a framework to ensure the
reliability of the substance of the testimony, separate and apart
from the inquiry into the expert's qualifications, to protect juries
from the influence of eminently well-qualified experts whose testi-• . . 88
mony was scientifically unreliable.
But courts applying the Daubert analysis have often become en-
tangled in the interplay between qualifications and reliability.89
Kumho Tire recognizes that in certain cases reliability concerns may
depend more upon the expert's personal knowledge or experience
than on the Daubert factors; in other words, the more qualified the
expert, the more reliable the opinion." This is especially true in
instances where the expert's personal experience is essential to the
methodology or analysis underlying the opinion. 91
In other instances, an expert's qualifications may also appro-
priately influence the court's assessment of reliability. Whether
overt or not, courts do, and should, make distinctions between tes-
timony from "the marginally-qualified full-time expert witness who
is testifying about a methodology that she has not employed in real
life" and "the highly credentialed expert who has devoted her life's
work to the actual exercise of the methodology upon which her tes-
timony is based.",92 Thus, even when an expert's resume satisfies the
87. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
88. Stated another way, "The Daubert Court's enthusiasm for barring some
scientific testimony has to reside in an unstated cynicism, about both the character
of some expert witnesses (they are charlatans) and the capacities of juries (com-
pared to judges) to detect charlatans." Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Ex-
pert Testimony After Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 879 (1994).
89. E.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir.
1994) (proposing three additional Daubert factors: the degree to which an expert
testifying is qualified, the relationship of a technique to more established modes of
scientific analysis and the non-judicial uses to which the scientific technique is
put).
90. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Charmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). Even in
these cases, however, "some of Daubert's questions can help to evaluate the reliabil-
ity even of experience-based testimony." Id.
91. E.g., Am. Computer Innovators, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 74 F.
Supp.2d 64, 69 (D. Mass 1999) (holding "investment consultant's" proposed testi-
mony regarding market size was methodologically sound, even though it was sim-
ply based on experience, because "this expert has in-depth, lengthy, personal ex-
perience in the very area in question. He is not analogous to the all-purpose
engineer who offers testimony on everything from refrigerators to diapers to air-
plane engines."); Lillis v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., No. Civ. 97-3459, 1999 WL
718231, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1999) (holding physician's testimony regarding
appropriate hospital standards admissible based, in part, on his qualifications).
92. Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The
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Rule 702 qualification threshold, the expert's credentials and pro-
fessional background may color the court's view of the reliability of
the expert's opinions.
V. CONCLUSION
Kumho Tire is especially significant in product liability litigation
for three reasons. First, it compels the trial court to exercise its
gate-keeping function as to all experts, whether their testimony re-
lates to product design, warnings issues, causation or damages.
Second, Kumho Tire requires the trial court to make a preliminary
determination as to which Daubert factors or other reasonable
measures of reliability should apply to its evaluation of an expert's
testimony. Finally, it invites courts to create and apply reliability
factors in addition to those articulated in Daubert. In so doing,
Kumho Tire has expanded and intensified the trial court's duties in
examining expert testimony. At the same time, it has provide at-
torneys with the opportunity to assist the court in discharging its
gate-keeping duties by defining the relevant reliability factors, in-
cluding factors other than those identified in Daubert.
"Prestige" Factor, 43 EMoRY L.J. 867, 881 (1994).
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